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Introduction
Avian influenza (AI)
is a viral disease of
poultry caused by any
influenza A virus.

These viruses can
commonly cause
asymptomatic or mild
infections in birds in
addition to the disease
AI, leading to a complex epidemiology.

Avian influenza (AI) is a viral disease of poultry, caused by influenzavirus A,
classified in the family Orthomyxoviridiae. The influenza A viruses maintained in birds
are commonly referred to as avian influenza viruses (AIVs). The AIVs are antigenically,
genetically, and biologically diverse; found worldwide in birds; and infect a variety of
avian species.
In addition to causing the disease called AI, these AIVs commonly cause
asymptomatic or very mild infections that go undetected in the absence of an active
laboratory-based virus surveillance program. These asymptomatic infections are important because they play a critical role in the epidemiology of AIV infections in birds and
in the maintenance of AIVs in avian populations. The unique complexities associated
with AI and AIVs must always be taken into account when developing or conducting
AI prevention, control, and eradication programs in poultry and wild birds.

This publication was made possible through funding provided by USAID/EGAT through Development Alternatives Inc.'s RAISE SPS Project ["Assistance for Trade
Capacity Building in Relation to the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures," Subcontract #4105-99S-006, under USAID/DAI Prime Contract
#PCE-I-00-99-00002-00, "Rural and Agricultural Incomes with a Sustainable Environment (RAISE)"]. The opinions expressed herein are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development or Development Alternatives Inc.
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Viruses are characterized as either high
pathogenicity or low
pathogenicity using
standard challenge
protocols in chickens.

The AIVs, along with type A influenza viruses recovered from lower mammals
and humans, are further subtyped based on the antigenic properties of their surface
glycoproteins: hemagglutinin (HA), of which 16 subtypes (H1-H16) have been identified, and neuraminidase (NA), of which 9 subtypes (N1-N9) have been identified
(Swayne and Halvorson 2003). All 16 HA and all 9 NA subtypes have been identified
among the AIVs recovered from birds. The AIVs are further characterized by genetic
sequencing and pathogenicity testing of the virus in chickens and classified as either
High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) or Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza
(LPAI), as defined by World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal
Health Code (OIE 2007a).

Asian-Lineage H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI)
From 2003 to 2005, a
lineage of Asian-origin
H5N1 HPAI viruses
infecting poultry and
wild birds spread across
Asia and into Europe
and Africa.

Considering the large
number of human
exposures that have
likely occurred and
the 322 documented
human infections, the
transmission of Asianlineage H5N1 HP AIV
from poultry to people
seems to be relatively
uncommon.

Correct use of efficacious vaccines as part
of overall control and
eradication strategies in
endemic areas will be
critical.

Routine use of AI
vaccine in industrial
poultry production is
rare.

From the beginning of 2003 through 2005, a lineage of Asian-origin H5N1
HPAI viruses infecting poultry and wild birds spread across Asia and into Europe and
Africa. By June 2007 more than 64 countries had reported outbreaks or cases in poultry
and/or wild birds. These viruses are now considered to be endemic in many areas and
are expected to present serious agriculture concerns during the next few years.
Since 2003 there have been more than 322 human cases, including 195 deaths,
reported to the World Health Organization (as of August 2007), with new bird and
human cases being reported in Eurasia and less frequently in Africa (WHO 2007).
Most human infections apparently resulted from close contact with affected poultry
or defeathering and preparing poultry that were sick or had succumbed to infection.
Considering the large number of human exposures that have likely occurred and
the 322 documented human infections, the transmission of the Asian lineage of H5N1
HP AIV from poultry to people seems to be a relatively uncommon event. Still, considering the possibility that many human cases have gone undiagnosed, as well as a small
cluster of cases in Sumatra where human-to-human transmission seems to have
occurred, the potential public health threat presented by the Asian-lineage H5N1 HP
AIV is very concerning and must be addressed continually and vigorously.
One tool used for control and eradication efforts has been vaccination. This
strategy has had varying degrees of long-term success, and the use of vaccine is still
controversial in some circles. Yet in endemic areas, the loss of income and critical animal protein supplies and the cases of human infection have dictated, and will continue
to dictate, the pragmatic use of vaccine. The correct use of efficacious vaccines as part
of overall control and eradication strategies to combat Asian-lineage H5N1 HPAI virus
in these areas will be critical.

The Science of Avian Influenza Vaccination
Vaccination against many poultry diseases has been used for decades in the
industrialized poultry production systems world wide, but routine use of AI vaccine in
industrial poultry production is rare. The relatively recent global increase in infections
with H5N1 HP AIV and LPAI H5, H7, H9 AIVs in poultry has increased the research,
examination, and use of vaccination for these viruses in poultry populations. Vaccination
has been used, in combination with other measures, as an integral part of AI eradication
campaigns in Italy and Hong Kong (Capua and Marangon 2007b; Sims 2007).
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Efficacy of AI Vaccines
Current commercially
available vaccines will
not prevent infection
completely, but studies
have shown that properly used vaccines can
accomplish multiple
goals.

An ideal AI vaccine would provoke an immune response that protects against
disease and prevents infection (Swayne and Kapczynski 2008). Current commercially
available vaccines will not prevent infection completely, but experimental and field
studies have shown that properly used vaccines can accomplish multiple goals: (1) protect against clinical signs and death, (2) reduce shedding of field virus if vaccinated
poultry become infected, (3) prevent contact transmission of field virus, (4) protect
against challenges by low to high doses of field virus, (5) protect against a changing
virus, and (6) increase a bird's resistance to AI virus infection (Swayne 2006).
Protection provided by AI vaccines is dependent on vaccine quality: potency,
purity, efficacy and safety. Vaccine quality control guidelines are available in the OIE's
Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals and should be supplemented with national and regional requirements (OIE 2007a).

Selection of strains
for inclusion in poultry
AI vaccines should be
based on analysis of the
field challenge virus in
comparison with the
licensed vaccine strains.

If possible, selection of strains for inclusion in poultry AI vaccines should be
based on an analysis of the field challenge virus in comparison with the licensed vaccine
strains, which may require some flexibility in registration processes to allow for new
products and re-formulation of existing vaccines to facilitate timely adjustments of
vaccine formulation. Unlike human influenza A vaccines where antigenic drift of the
field virus requires changing vaccine strains every few years, antigenic drift of poultry
influenza viruses has not required a similar need to change the vaccine strain that often
(Swayne and Kapczynski 2008). In one study, an H5 vaccine strain provided broad protection against diverse H5 HPAI viruses collected during 38 years and differing as much
as 12% in amino acid sequence of the HA gene. The closer the HA gene sequence
similarity between vaccine and field viruses, however, the greater the reduction in challenge virus replication and shedding from the respiratory tract (Swayne and Kapczynski
2008). The use of a poorly matched vaccine can result in clinical disease and increased
virus shedding when vaccinated poultry are naturally infected (Suarez 2006).

Efficacy in Domestic Ducks and Geese
Several recent studies
examined AI vaccine
use in domestic ducks
and geese, all reporting
efficacy in ducks or
geese with the vaccine
used.

Most studies of AI vaccine use have involved chickens and turkeys because of
their high mortality rates (Swayne 2005). Determining the effectiveness of AI vaccines
in other species such as ducks and geese requires additional studies. Epidemiological
studies of Asian-lineage H5N1 HPAI outbreaks indicated the importance these species
play in transmission, maintenance, and amplification of H5N1 HPAI in Asia (Sims
2006; Webster et al. 2006), highlighting the need for specific studies of vaccine efficacy
in these species. Several recent studies examined AI vaccine use in domestic ducks and
geese, all reporting efficacy in ducks or geese with the vaccine used against a specific
challenge virus from the group of Asian-lineage H5N1 HP AIVs (Beato et al. 2007;
Middleton et al. 2007; Qiao et al. 2006; Webster et al. 2006).

AI vaccines stimulate
the production of
antibodies against the
hemagglutinin portion
of the virus, the major
protective mechanism
against natural viral
infection and replication.

Immunity to AI Vaccines
AI vaccines stimulate the production of antibodies against the hemagglutinin
portion of the virus, the major protective mechanism against natural viral infection and
replication. Vaccines against AI will not prevent infection completely (Suarez 2005;
Swayne 2006). With use of an efficacious AIV vaccine, viral replication in the respiratory and intestinal tract is significantly reduced in vaccinated birds, reflected by the inability to isolate challenge virus to the same magnitude in vaccinated chickens versus
nonvaccinated chickens, with data collaborating that finding from multiple laboratories.
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Duration of immunity
varies based on number
of doses given, bird’s
age at time of vaccination, antigen quantity in
each dose of vaccine,
and avian species.

The duration of effective immunity will vary based on the number of doses
given, age of bird at time of vaccination, antigen quantity in each dose of vaccine, and
avian species. Using traditional whole virus inactivated oil-emulsion vaccines in chickens, peak hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers are observed 4-6 weeks postvaccination
(Brugh, Beard, and Stone 1979), with the same work indicating a much lower seroconversion rate in turkeys. Additional studies in turkeys indicate two doses of inactivated
vaccine are necessary to reduce virus shedding and replication to levels needed to
reduce viral spread (Karunakaran et al. 1987).
Most published onset and duration of immunity studies are in specific-pathogenfree (SPF) birds in laboratory settings; little field evidence is presented or published.
Field use of AI vaccine introduces management conditions that are usually not present
in laboratory studies on vaccine efficacy. Among the things that should be considered
are (1) the type of vaccine, (2) the administration of less than a full dose, (3) improper
storage and handling, (4) missed birds, and (5) immune suppression and maternal
immunity (Swayne 2006). Therefore, the practical immunity achieved in vaccination
campaigns will be less than published research values.

Vaccines
Two main types of vaccine are widely licensed
with proven efficacy:
inactivated, whole-virus
vaccines and a recombinant fowl pox-vectored
vaccine with an H5
insert.

Two main types of vaccine with proven efficacy are widely licensed by countries: inactivated, whole-virus vaccines from several manufacturers (FAO 2007) and a
recombinant fowl pox-vectored vaccine with an H5 insert from Merial (Bublot et al.
2006). With the epizootic of H5N1, many novel vaccines are under investigation or
were recently licensed for use in some countries. No published or presented research
compares these novel products available in limited countries with conventional AI
vaccines.

Vaccine Production
With multiple manufacturers, standardized protocols must be enforced
to assure production of
an efficacious vaccine.

Vaccine production must be standardized. If the vaccination component of a
control program is to be successful, vaccines must be manufactured under the appropriate government authority to assure production of a highly efficacious vaccine. With
multiple manufacturers, standardized protocols must be enforced to assure production of
an efficacious vaccine. Global standards for the production of conventional inactivated
AI vaccines are available in the OIE's Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for
Terrestrial Animals, Chapter 2.7.12 (OIE 2007a).
Avian influenza vaccines should be produced from LPAI viruses, which are considered to be less dangerous than HPAI viruses in case of accidental escape during the
production process (Capua, I. 2007. Personal communication). Vaccine production using
HPAI viruses must be conducted in Containment Group 4 facilities (OIE 2007a), which
may not exist in developing countries.

Once the virus is in
the poultry population,
a successful control
strategy can be aided by
reducing the susceptibility and density of the
poultry population.

The Art of Controlling Avian Influenza
Under conditions of high poultry density or multiple poultry establishments in
one area, prevention and biosecurity may not be fully successful in preventing the entry
of the virus into the poultry population. Once the virus is in that population, a successful
control strategy can be aided by reducing the susceptibility and density of the poultry
population. The components of a control strategy generally include five basic categories:
(1) biosecurity and quarantine; (2) diagnostics and surveillance; (3) elimination of
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infected poultry or controlled marketing of convalescent poultry; (4) decreasing host
susceptibility to the pathogen by vaccination; and (5) education of personnel, owners,
and villagers on disease transmission, prevention, and control (Swayne 2006).

Widespread use of
vaccine against HPAI is
being used with increasing frequency in countries experiencing large
outbreaks of Asianlineage H5N1 HPAI,
especially, but not only,
in nonconfined poultry
populations.

In developing nations with extensive poultry production systems, AI vaccine
has sometimes been used broadly for control where eradication of endemic influenza is
not deemed to be achievable. Several Asian and Middle Eastern countries have reported
use of H9N2 vaccine to prevent the clinical and economic effects of LPAI infection
(Naaem et. al 2007). Widespread use of vaccine against HPAI is less common but is
being used with increasing frequency in countries experiencing large outbreaks of
Asian-lineage H5N1 HPAI, especially, but not only, in nonconfined poultry populations.
In several Asian and African countries where Asian-lineage H5N1 HPAI seems to be
endemic, vaccination likely will need to continue indefinitely because of production
systems present in those cultures. In countries where disease is endemic, an initial
approach based on control rather than eradication will be required, and eradication may
take years to achieve (Sims 2007). Global agencies are predicting a 7- to 10-year time
span to get many of these infected countries back to an Asian-lineage H5N1 HPAI-free
status (FAO-WHO 2005).
In other countries with intensive commercial poultry enterprises, AI vaccine
occasionally is used as part of a control and eradication program for LPAI and rarely as
a part of preventive, control, and eradication programs for HPAI.

Biosecurity
Biosecurity should be
the primary component
of all AI prevention,
control, and eradication
plans.

Biosecurity, the prevention of exposure to disease agents through management
practices (isolation of infected and uninfected flocks, traffic control, and sanitation),
should be the primary component of all avian influenza prevention, control, and eradication plans (Halvorson 2002). The physical and functional separation in the poultry
industries accounts for much of the disease prevention success in commercial poultry
production throughout the world.
Preventing the introduction of AIV by eliminating direct and indirect contact
between commercial poultry and wild birds, swine farms, and live bird markets is a
common and successful practice. Likewise, eliminating direct and indirect contact
between poultry farms has been highly successful in preventing the spread of AI
outbreaks.

Biosecurity practices
have to be appropriate
to the farming system.

The production chain
for most biologics
companies requires a
minimum of 10 to 12
weeks for production
and testing of an AI
vaccine.

Attempts to apply biosecurity practices that are effective in commercial poultry
directly to other systems are not helpful. Instead, practices have to be appropriate to the
farming system (Sims 2007). This requires a local understanding of a matrix of the
sources of the virus, how the virus moves, knowledge of the poultry populations
involved, cross-over points between populations, and exposure risk level (Halvorson
2008).

Availability of AI Vaccines
The overall effectiveness of an AI vaccination program is directly related to the
time span between index case(s) and the implementation of appropriate controls, including vaccine administration (Capua and Marangon 2003) in an emergency response to
introduced infection. If vaccine is used, immediate accessibility to quality AI vaccines is
necessary for vaccination to be a viable option in a control plan. The production chain
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Countries or groups of
countries at high risk
for H5 or H7 introductions should consider
establishing their own
AI vaccine banks.

for most biologics companies requires a minimum of 10 to 12 weeks for production and
testing of an AI vaccine if the field strain is selected or a licensed master seed is used.
The number of doses needed for an outbreak situation may be held at any time point by
global biologics companies, but it may not be sufficient for vaccination in areas of dense
poultry populations. For this reason, countries or groups of countries at high risk for H5
or H7 introductions should consider establishing their own AI vaccine banks.

Concerns Surrounding AI Vaccination of Poultry
Several questionable arguments against vaccination for AI have been discussed
surrounding recent Asian-lineage H5N1 HPAI outbreaks. The following scenarios have
been suggested by opponents of AI vaccination use based on unavailability of sufficient
scientific evidence:

Speculation about
potential problems of
vaccine use must be
balanced with the real
problem of outbreaks in
susceptible poultry.

Vaccination can actually
reduce the opportunity
for natural mutation
or reassortment by
reducing the quantity
of circulating virus.

•

Vaccination will drive antigenic change in the viruses.

•

These changes may create a virus that has increased transmissibility to
humans.

•

Use of vaccine in poultry will hide clinical signs and mortality in poultry,
which is currently used as an alert for human health professionals to look
for human cases.

•

Vaccination will allow the virus to be maintained in the poultry population
through inapparent infections and lead to increased pathogenicity.

•

A vaccination campaign that is not managed appropriately is likely to result
in endemic AI infection (Capua and Marangon 2007b).

Like previous objections to AI vaccine use (Halvorson 2002) these objections
fail to address the question of whether lack of vaccine use is in any way superior to
vaccine use. Speculation about potential problems of vaccine use must be balanced with
the real problem of outbreaks in susceptible poultry. No published literature compares
the rate of antigenic shift, the creation of a more transmissible virus, the creation of a
more pathogenic virus, or a tendency to endemicity during infections in vaccinated
poultry verses nonvaccinated poultry. Experience with other influenza virus vaccines
(canine, swine, equine) cannot be correlated with poultry because the AIV vaccines are
very different from mammalian influenza virus vaccines (poultry vaccines are oiladjuvanted) and poultry are shorter lived than dogs, horses, and pigs. In theory, antigenic shift will occur at a given rate regardless of the vaccination status of the
susceptible avian population.
“It is unlikely that vaccination of poultry will exert a selection pressure on the
cell receptor of the HA protein that might lead to an increase in the transmissibility of
the virus to mammals. Thus vaccination can actually reduce the opportunity for natural
mutation or reassortment by reducing the quantity of circulating virus.” (FAO 2004)
This objection also was made during vaccination against H5N1 in 2002 in Hong Kong,
with Ellis and colleagues commenting that unvaccinated flocks will replicate increased
amounts of virus and shed higher quantities of virus that will infect additional flocks
and, potentially, humans (Ellis et al. 2004). Theoretically over time, the effective use of
an appropriate AI vaccine will reduce the levels of AI virus shed into the environment
by infected birds, thereby reducing the viral exposure to humans.
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If an AI vaccine is efficacious, it will greatly reduce clinical signs and mortality,
but possible circulating viruses should be detected through surveillance mechanisms
implemented along with the vaccination program. Prompt isolation and characterization
of the circulating viruses allows quick detection of virus changes.

The Decision to Use AI Vaccination
In all cases where a decision to use AI vaccine is considered, the overall goals
need to be examined. The following goals for AI vaccination programs have been suggested: (1) routine vaccination in endemic areas, (2) emergency vaccination during an
epidemic, and (3) preventive or prophylactic vaccination when the risk of AI virus introduction is high (Swayne 2006).
Prophylactic AI vaccination will provide
protective immunity in
the target population,
increasing resistance to
infection, with the ultimate objective of preventing the index case.

Prophylactic vaccination can be considered when available information indicates that the country/zone/compartment is at high risk for AI infection, with either H5
or H7 subtype or a known subtype (H5N1 in Asia, H7N2 in U.S. live bird markets).
This strategy will provide protective immunity in the target population, increasing
resistance to infection, with the ultimate objective of preventing the index case. In the
event of introduction, prophylactic vaccination will reduce shedding of virus when
biosecurity is maintained and potentially minimize the number of secondary outbreaks
(Capua and Marangon 2007b).
Depending on the situation, the goal may be simply to protect against clinical
signs and death, or it may be to contribute to the eradication of AI virus from a region,
zone, or compartment by increasing resistance to infection and reducing viral excretion.
In cases of endemic infection or high likelihood of challenge, the goal of vaccination
might be to protect against disease, increase resistance to infection, reduce the number
of susceptible birds, and reduce the likelihood of human exposure.

AI vaccination must be
considered to be a complement to other control
measures, as part of a
science-based AI control strategy.

It has been shown that
proper use of vaccine
can prevent infections,
and surveillance can
verify that vaccinated
flocks for export are
not infected.

In deciding to use AI vaccines as part of a control program, several issues must
be addressed including the needs of the poultry producer, availability of local resources,
the poultry production system(s), the veterinary infrastructure, laboratory capacity for
surveillance, biosecurity and ability to maintain a cold chain for the vaccine. Avian
influenza vaccination must be considered to be a complement to other control measures.
Vaccination should be available as part of a science-based AI control strategy (Halvorson 2002) that includes the following, where possible: (1) enhanced biosecurity, (2) an
eradication plan, (3) controlled vaccination for flocks deemed to be at risk, (4) suitable
monitoring of all flocks at risk and of all vaccinated flocks, and (5) a repopulation plan
(Swayne 2006).
Political and economic considerations also may influence the decision to use
vaccine as a tool to aid in control of AI. Historically, vaccine use has been viewed as an
admission that AI is endemic in a country, and this has been used to justify embargoes
of poultry exports from the affected country. More recently it has been shown that proper use of vaccine can prevent infections, and surveillance can verify that vaccinated
flocks for export are not infected. The new OIE chapter on AI enables continuation of
trade in the presence of vaccination (OIE 2007b). Finally, pre-emptive slaughter has
caused destruction of great numbers of non-infected birds, and can be questioned from
effectiveness, economical and ethical points of view (Capua and Marangon 2007b).
The decision to vaccinate or not to vaccinate should ultimately be made by official government veterinary authorities in a given country, with input from local or state
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authorities and the commercial poultry industry. In the face of the spread of H5N1
HPAI, however, illegal or uncontrolled vaccination occurred and continues to occur in
some countries (Jagne, J. 2007. Personal communication). Authorities must take several
factors into account to inform their decision making: the disease situation in the country,
structure of poultry production in the country, socio-economic impact, risk of disease,
costs and benefits, availability of technology and qualified personnel, and possible
impacts on markets.

Once vaccination is
selected as a tool in an
eradication program
against an AI virus, an
exit strategy must be in
place to know end
points of the program
and define determinants
of success.

Many unknowns remain
involving AI vaccine
usage.

Once vaccination is selected as a tool in an eradication program against an AI
virus, an exit strategy must be in place to know end points of the program and define
determinants of success. Monitoring tests throughout the vaccination protocol will determine when the virus circulation has been stopped and virus eliminated and vaccination
can be halted. An ongoing monitoring program also must be included to continue active
surveillance once vaccination has stopped. If eradication of the virus is unlikely to be
achieved in the medium to long term because of the nature of the poultry industry, an
exit strategy may not be applicable, but the vaccination campaign should be reviewed
to assess its necessity and any changes in the target population. Ongoing surveillance is
required to determine the success of the campaign. Measures of success of the campaign
should be established and monitored (e.g., number of clinical cases or lack of virus
isolation).
Many unknowns remain involving AI vaccine usage. The many sources of vaccine and the many species of birds mean that large gaps in knowledge exist in vaccine
potency, appropriate vaccination regimen, levels of immunity to stop infection, which
species to vaccinate, how to vaccinate each species, and so forth. What has been
observed and reported in North America, Western Europe, Hong Kong, and other areas
is that when AI vaccine has been used as part of an organized AI control program, success has been achieved according to the goals of the vaccine use (Adriatico 2005;
Capua and Marangon 2007a; Ellis et al. 2003; Frame et al. 1996).

Surveillance in the Vaccinated Population
Surveillance needs are
dependent on the goal
of the vaccination
program.

Surveillance needs are dependent on the goal of the vaccination program. If AI
vaccination is used only to protect against clinical disease and death, the first level of a
control program, surveillance to demonstrate adequate protection following field vaccination is needed.
If vaccination is used to decrease virus shedding and stop virus transmission
and spread, with advanced AI control and eradication as the goals, a robust monitoring
system must be put in place by appropriate authorities. This system should allow for
serological and virological monitoring of the vaccinated birds. Although AIV infection
in AI-vaccinated flocks is rare, the monitoring program is necessary to promptly identify
field-infected birds in the vaccinated population. Once infected, vaccinated flocks are
identified, they should be quarantined and then depopulated or slaughtered by controlled
marketing to reduce the risk that they act as a source of infection for other farms
(Capua, I. 2007. Personal communication). Surveillance also should be conducted in
vaccinated populations to identify viruses that emerge as vaccine-resistant strains and to
identify problems with the vaccine protocol or vaccine quality that are providing inadequate protection (Swayne, D.E. 2007. Personal communication).
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Conclusions
Tools such as vaccination, used within a
defined control program,
are available to allow
protection of public
health, food security,
and profitability, as well
as disease control.

In the past, aggressive eradication programs (e.g., stamping-out or mass depopulation) were needed in exporting countries to preserve poultry export markets when
HPAI or LPAI outbreaks would occur. Application of aggressive programs may not be
successful in all situations. Tools such as vaccination, used within a defined control program, are available to allow protection of public health, food security, and profitability,
as well as disease control.
Major concepts to be considered when examining AI vaccine use include the
following:
•

High-quality AI vaccines do protect poultry from disease, increase resistance to infection, and decrease excretion rate if vaccinated birds do become
infected.

•

Most research has been done with chickens and turkeys, so studies are
needed in other species.

•

Immunity and protection is largely HA based, so the vaccine strain must be
same HA subtype and have adequate HA content or proprietary adjuvant.

•

Vaccine should be standardized; proper handling must be explained.

•

Protection from the vaccine used can be assessed through seroconversion
and challenge studies.

•

AI vaccines should be manufactured to be effective under a wide variety of
species and conditions. Only inactivated and viral-vectored products are
commercially available today.

•

AI vaccine can be used in emergency, routine, or preventive programs; use
should be part of a total program-vaccine alone will not eradicate AIV.
Locally appropriate biosecurity practices and virus- or sero-surveillance are
necessary along with identification of an exit strategy (Swayne 2008).
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